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Abstract
Purpose: The article discusses selected methodological issues of natural and social sciences with 
particular consideration of behavioural economics to highlight the significance of experimental 
research. 
Design approach: The order of the issues covered is as follows: (a) science as a product of a research 
community, (b) basic cognitive activities in science, (c) a short description of social sciences, (d) 
a discussion on the methods applied in behavioural economics. 
Findings: The article offers a description of research procedure, its objectives and the methods 
applied therein; it has been stressed that testing theories and hypotheses involves exposing them 
to falsification; it has been emphasised that research conducted within the framework of social 
sciences is more difficult than in the case of natural sciences because of the large number of inde­
pendent variables and the possible interaction between the researcher and research participants. 
Practical implications: The content presented in the article highlights the value of scientific find­
ings as opposed to common-sense knowledge adopted with the disregard of the principles of proper 
methodology. 
Value: The authors believe that the emergence of behavioural economics was an attempt to overcome 
certain deficiencies in the methodology of classical economics by means of experimental research.
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Introduction
Issues related to progress in science and conducting scientific research tend to be 
surrounded by controversy. We would like to use this paper to briefly discuss selected 
methodological issues from the social sciences in relation to the relatively fresh dis­
cipline of behavioural economics. It is based on different paradigms than classical 
economics, e.g. it allows for deviations from the rationality of market participants and 
for drivers other than profit maximisation (Morawski, 2016). Still, the dissimilarity 
of paradigms is not the topic of this paper. We rather intended to focus on the research 
procedure, on the objectives and methods applied therein, and to refer at the same time 
to the fundamental principles of research practice. We will try to cover the methodo­
logical imperfections of social sciences which have contributed to the appearance of 
the behavioural approach, as it is quite important to note that behavioural economics 
is not the only behaviour­oriented approach in social sciences. Recent years have seen 
the emergence of such disciplines as behavioural law, behavioural ethics, behavioural 
finance, and behavioural management. At this point, it is necessary to mention the 
emergence of a new paradigm in economics, combining the descriptive and normative 
approach (Kołodko, 2017). To begin with, it seems reasonable to recall the standards 
of research procedures applied in science, which will make it possible to present the 
issues which are of interest to us in a clear manner. 
Explanations of reality as offered by science have been changing the way people think 
about themselves and the world for many years now. Whenever we talk about a sci­
entific understanding of reality, it does not pertain to any kind of enlightenment, any 
contemplative state combined with extraordinary experiences or the transformation 
of consciousness. A scientist’s vision of the world is objective and verifiable. Scientific 
understanding is commonly available, open to the public, and able to be tested and 
verified by anyone ‘equipped with’ the right competence. A scientist does their best 
to let other researchers become familiar with their line of thought and research results, 
compare them with their own findings, and eventually approve or criticise them. This 
applies to all outcomes of scientific activity – every idea aspiring to become accepted 
as a truth is thoroughly and critically investigated and examined by research com­
munities. In the case of science, there is no possibility of substantiating propositions 
by referring to the opinions of respectable people, to ancient records, or to time­honou­
red commonly professed beliefs. The development of science is about a constant clash 
of views, a battle of ideas, whose outcome leads to the survival of only the fittest, the 
ones that are best proven and compliant with the highest standards. In the world of 
science, no proposition is considered eternal. Every claim may be undermined in the 
future; the process of verification never ends. There is a permanent analysis of and 
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search for loopholes in already accepted theories, key experiments are replicated, and 
earlier perspectives, inaccuracies, and gaps in reasoning are challenged. The sustained 
development of scientific knowledge leads to situations where it is sometimes neces­
sary to thoroughly revise old views that were once regarded as unquestionable and 
final. They need to be adapted to new standards, or substituted with new ones. Carl 
Sagan (1934–1996), an astronomer and science populariser, perceived science as a self-cor­
recting process. Paradoxically, this constant unrest, this scepticism, this ceaseless 
clash of ideas and the freedom to criticise do not lead to anarchy or chaos, but rather 
act as the driving force behind progress in science. Fields aspiring to become bodies 
of knowledge but devoid of the abovementioned element of dispute and absolute criticism 
do not develop, but remain stagnant (Szymanek and Zielonka, 2017). 
Individual views that have not been scientifically verified, but are based only on an 
individual’s access to limited knowledge and supported by irregular, common obser­
vation do not deserve to be trusted as much as science is. The effects of building 
knowledge based on non-systematic observation was perhaps best exemplified in the 
past by medicine, where it was not until the 20th century that a methodologically 
correct verification of therapy techniques was applied. Medical knowledge was based 
not on the results of experiments and observation, but on the experience of individual 
physicians. The effects of the situation proved disastrous. L.J. Henderson, a biochemist 
from Harvard University, claimed that not until 1910 did the average ill person seeing 
a randomly selected doctor have a more than 50% chance to benefit from their appoint­
ment (Szczeklik, 2002). The reason for this was not physicians’ limited intellectual 
capacity, poor perceptiveness, or lack of care, but a lack of methodological awareness, 
which made researchers draw completely ungrounded conclusions. The automatic 
psychological inclinations emerging and governing people’s judgments in such metho-
dological obscurity made it impossible to reason correctly, rendering those judgments 
tendentious and insensitive to signals of potential erroneousness. Falling into the 
confirmation bias trap was very common because people are driven by an impulse to 
search for and remember only the data that proves their own hypotheses, at the same 
time failing to notice, forgetting, or ignoring any inconvenient cases. If someone who 
disregards methodological standards tests a hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of 
a drug while driven by such impulses, they will be willing to consider all cases of 
recovery from a disease after the application of said drug as evidence to support their 
hypothesis, and regard and mentally record all instances of failure in treatment using 
the drug as exceptions. It is important to stress that even if the majority of patients 
recover from illness after they are prescribed a given drug, this will still not prove 
the effectiveness of the drug. Many diseases subside spontaneously, by themselves. It 
is therefore possible that patients may recover regardless of having taken the drug. If 
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there is no control group, we may not know how many patients would have recovered 
without taking the drug. Conducting studies on a random experimental group and 
a control group of appropriate number of subjects determined on the basis of statistics 
is a precondition for assessing the effectiveness of any therapy. A rigorous research 
regime also involves the application of the double-blind standard: no patients know 
which group they belong to, nor do any researchers know it when evaluating each 
patient’s condition (Szymanek and Zielonka, 2017).
Laws in science
The laws applied in psychology or medicine differ from those functioning in natural 
sciences such as classical physics, to give but one example. The latter are of determini-
stic nature, which means that according to such laws, whenever certain conditions 
occur, a certain phenomenon has to take place as well. In the case of some medical 
sciences, psychology, or economics, probabilistic laws (or rather regularities) are usually 
identified, according to which the occurrence of certain conditions does not make 
a phenomenon bound to happen, but only likely to do so. Such likelihood, or proba­
bility, is often given in figures (e.g.: “fever occurs in 60% of cases of disease x”), but 
the laws in use frequently tend to imply only that a given effect occurs more often in 
the experimental group than in the control group. Both the identification and utilisa­
tion of probabilistic laws in research practice are challenging and may be the source 
of errors. Probabilistic laws manifest themselves not in one­off cases, but in groups. 
Finding that an effect occurs in a certain situation may not be considered either a proof 
of or a contradiction to a probabilistic law. This is a mistake referred to as small sample 
error, also known as: “I know a person who...” The latter comes from the common but 
incorrect attempts which people make to deny probabilistic laws. For instance, when 
a smoking addict hears of the scientifically proven harmfulness of smoking to human 
health, they respond: “OK, but I know a person who smokes two packs of cigarettes 
a day and is in great shape, and this year marks their ninety-fifth birthday.” To form 
an opinion about certain probabilistic regularity, it is necessary to look into a number 
of cases. Fallacious understanding of probabilistic laws is also related to a very com­
mon mistake known as post hoc ergo propter hoc (“after this, therefore because of 
this”), which implies that A is the cause of B when B occurs after the occurrence of 
A (Szymanek and Zielonka, 2017). 
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Formal sciences
An important difference between sciences lies in the method of substantiating propo-
sitions. In the case of formal sciences, also referred to as a priori sciences, such as 
formal logic and mathematics, a researcher may substantiate a new proposition without 
leaving their chair, or even without opening their eyes after waking up. Substantiation 
involves deriving a proposition through appropriate transformations within a system 
of axiomatic propositions called axioms, which is about finding a proof to support 
this proposition. A proposition, once proven, remains proven for ever and will never 
be undermined by anyone. However, formal science propositions do not concern 
empirical reality nor say anything about it. They refer to abstract ideas which cannot 
be experienced through the senses, such as numbers, geometric figures, or vector 
spaces. No observation or experiment may either deny or prove any mathematically 
proven truth. These areas, speaking in general terms, provide tools to process infor­
mation, construct notions useful for analysing reality (e.g. number, square, function), 
and identify the relations they are subject to, which makes it possible to draw precise 
and objective conclusions. Whenever it is possible to express some data in mathematical 
terms, mathematics and logic will help to extract information out of it. It is possible 
to determine what can and what cannot be inferred from such data with absolute 
accuracy. Yet mathematics “doesn’t know” what the researcher wants to present using 
numbers or geometric figures and what their objective is. Its view encompasses only 
the abstract content of these notions. Mathematical models are governed by absolute, 
precise and strict rules, and the responsibility for their correct adaptation to the ana­
lysed reality rests with researchers (Shapiro, 1997).
Empirical sciences
Unlike in the case of formal sciences, empirical sciences describe reality that can be 
experienced through the senses, and do not offer any truths proven once and for all. 
Propositions are substantiated only to a certain extent, and even those substantiated 
best may turn out to be erroneous in the future. Researchers are condemned to much 
guesswork when searching for regularities and laws governing reality. Contrary to 
popular belief, facts do not speak for themselves: scientific theories cannot be inter­
preted based on data collected or deduced in an objective manner from accumulated 
knowledge. Any set of facts contains numerous different regularities that cannot be 
reconciled with one another, and there is no method that would make it possible to 
determine a priori which of these regularities actually governs our reality and works 
for newly emerging data. The only thing a researcher can do is to use their knowledge 
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and experience to try to guess the truth and then confront it with reality (Quine and 
Ullian, 1978; Chalmers, 2004). This procedure is called putting forward hypotheses, 
followed by testing them. A researcher tries to make the proposed hypothesis coherent 
with known facts so that it does not lead to conclusions opposing the accumulated 
observations, and it is possible to conclude as many known facts as possible on such 
a basis. A hypothesis should offer correct predictions that are unknown at the time 
it is proposed. Therefore, a hypothesis exists because of its consequences, and its entire 
value comes down to what can be inferred from it. 
The basic method of testing hypotheses is about checking the correctness of conclu­
sions drawn from them. A typical scientific hypothesis concerns an infinite number 
of events and refers to issues that are not directly observable (Skyrms, 2000; Quine 
and Ullian, 1970). It is never possible to exhaust all cases, and the verification proce­
dure is never final. There are never sufficient grounds to claim that a hypothesis has 
been proven conclusively. But passing a certain number of tests successfully induces 
researcher communities to regard a given hypothesis as sufficiently proven to consider 
it an element of scientific knowledge (Nola and Sankey, 2007).
However, it is not only the number of tests that counts, but also their strictness. The 
stricter the tests a given hypothesis is subject to, the better proven this hypothesis is. 
The more likely it is that a given test exposes the falseness of a hypothesis if it is actually 
false, the stricter such a test is considered. For instance, the more precise the measure-
ment instrumentation in use, the stricter the test. Sensitive tools will detect even 
a slight deviation from prediction, so if no such deviation has been discovered, the 
better it is for the tested hypothesis. It quite often happens that according to current 
knowledge, conditions X should trigger q, but the tested hypothesis proves it wrong 
– because it shows that what follows is the occurrence of r. So when it turns out that 
r instead of q occurs in conditions X, we can say that the hypothesis has been subject 
to strict tests, and the stronger the grounds to think that q would occur in conditions 
X, the stricter the test appears to be (Popper, 1959).
Falsification
If researchers across the globe came across only white swans, they should not simply 
assume that all swans are definitely white. Even if they encountered millions of white 
– and only white – swans, it would not be conclusive proof to support the hypothesis 
that all swans are white, but would only mean that there are no reasons to reject 
a hypothesis that all swans are white. Once the first non-white (e.g. black) swan is 
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spotted, the hypothesis becomes refuted. Therefore, until a hypothesis is disproved, 
it may be treated as true (Zielonka, 2003).
It is pointless to test hypotheses for which it is impossible to design a test that could 
– even theoretically – lead to considering a given hypotheses false, i.e. hypothesis 
falsification (Popper, 1959). A non-falsifiable hypothesis may be reconciled with any 
state of affairs, which makes it highly uninformative with regard to reality. An example 
may be an astrological prediction: “It is possible that you’ll have a meeting with a Pisces 
next week”. Whatever happens next week, whether there is a meeting with a Pisces or 
not, the prediction will certainly not be proven wrong. It is impossible to find a state 
of affairs that – if it came true – would render the prediction false. To compare, a falsi-
fiable hypothesis is “All ravens are black”. The sentence may be considered false after 
we come across a green raven. Falsifiability is a gradable quality, and can be limited 
to a smaller or larger extent by the way in which a hypothesis is formulated. Sometimes 
hypotheses are formulated in too general a manner, or unclearly, depending on the 
implicit conditions accepted in silence. It is then difficult to investigate which obser­
vation or potentially true fact could contradict the formulated hypothesis. Which fact 
could stand in opposition to the following hypothesis: “The market will achieve balance 
sooner or later”. If the market achieves balance after a year, the hypothesis will turn 
out to be accurate. If not, it will be impossible to consider it false – after all, it argues 
that balance will occur “sooner or later” – not necessarily after a year. 
Of course, there are even greater research difficulties with probabilistic hypotheses 
such as: “In conditions X r will occur at a probability rate of p”. For instance: “When 
X occurs, in the majority of cases r occurs as well”. In such situations, a one-off obser­
vation of the occurrence or absence of r in conditions X has no value as a hypothesis 
test. In the case of a probabilistic hypothesis, testing requires making a number of 
repeated observations.
It is therefore crucial to clearly determine what does and does not result from a given 
hypothesis when it is tested. This is where a significant difference between the natu-
ral and social sciences appears. Thanks to the concrete form of notions used in social 
sciences and to the wide­ranging application of mathematics, we are able to draw very 
precise and clear conclusions from the analysed hypotheses. Drawing such a conclu­
sion often involves replacing numbers in a given formula. In the case of social sciences, 
the situation is much more difficult. Here, deciding if a given conclusion does or does 
not result from the presented hypothesis may be infected with subjectivity. If there 
are different views on what stems from the analysed hypothesis, there appears a serious 
difficulty in testing it. 
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Theories
When we say that something stems from a hypothesis, it is usually about a conclusion 
drawn on the basis of the hypothesis and some additional statements that have pre­
viously been considered true. Hypotheses in science appear in the context of a broader 
ordered set of propositions and ideas, definitions, postulates, and models related 
thereto, referred to collectively as a theory. The most important propositions of theo­
ries are those that express the laws governing the analysed reality. Building a theory 
is a fundamental cognitive activity in science, aimed at organising a chaotic reality 
through the notional isolation of the most important elements thereof and by indicating 
the relationships occurring among them. Theories differ to a great extent in terms of 
their scope, degree of coverage, coherence, precision of formulation, and methodological 
advancement (Suppe, 1977). They are extended hypotheses, subject to testing in the 
aforementioned manner. In the case of natural sciences, a scientific theory is a system 
of propositions providing explanations and predictions, generating empirically test­
able hypotheses. As an example, Democritus’ views connected with the idea of the atomic 
structure of matter were not a scientific theory. It is impossible to use these views to 
derive any hypotheses that would concern observable facts. It was a purely speculative 
concept, unlike John Dalton’s atomic theory that appeared thousands of years later 
and offered precise quantitative empirical predictions. The term of theory is sometimes 
used in a different sense in the case of social sciences. It is referred to, for example, 
in deliberations about the history of various ideas, in very general analyses, or in 
speculative discussions about certain concepts.  
Different theories often pertain to the same area of reality, but it might still be imprac­
ticable to reconcile them. This is where the problem of the selection of the best theory 
appears, which becomes a challenge because there are many different criteria to check 
the quality of theories, which results in a situation where it is generally impossible to 
choose the best one using objective tools. Theories are expected to be falsifiable, simple, 
precise, general, and coherent with both the remainder of the knowledge possessed 
and with related theories (Kuhn, 1977). A single theory may be superior to another in 
certain terms, but at the same time inferior in other terms. Theories usually tend to 
develop, which causes their original characteristics to change: certain flaws are elimi-
nated, but there are others that may take their place. Frequently, despite some evident 
drawbacks of a theory, a group of researchers may regard it as promising and devote 
their time and effort to explore it. Copernican heliocentric theory was originally clear 
in its opposition to physical and astronomical theories of the time, and Ptolemy’s 
competing theory was consistent with them. Both theories were similarly complex 
and did not differ much in terms of accuracy. But the qualities of Copernicus’ theory 
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caused several remarkable scientists of the time to support it. Their work helped remove 
the theory’s flaws step by step, and new discoveries in physics and astronomy showed 
that certain flaws actually only seemed to be so. After Kepler’s concept of elliptical 
orbits was introduced, the heliocentric theory became incomparably simpler and more 
accurate than the competing theory. Years of development proved that it outclassed 
the geocentric theory in all possible aspects (Kuhn, 1985). Such an unqualified victory 
of one theory over another is a phenomenon typical of natural sciences, yet is much 
rarer in the case of social sciences, where it is normal to see two or more theories 
concerning the same aspects of reality coexist. 
Explanation
Although collecting objective data in scientific research is crucial, obtaining even the 
most extensive knowledge of a topic does not create science. Alchemists previously 
possess a vast body of information about chemical substances, but their knowledge 
certainly did not deserve to be called science. Science is required to offer much more 
than just a description of reality. Scientific theories exist to condense complex know-
ledge into simple, precise, and clearly formulated laws that govern the world in which 
we live. A scientific understanding of reality is manifested in building theories which 
are able to explain and foresee various phenomena. Explaining is, essentially, provid­
ing answers to the question of “why?” This question appears when it is known that 
a given phenomenon has occurred, but what has caused it, what other phenomena 
have contributed to its occurrence, and why it has followed the course it has remains 
unknown (Ruben, 2004). The most perfect method of explanation in science involves 
presenting a phenomenon as a set of certain fixed relationships expressed in sentences 
such as: Whenever X, then also Y. According to this theory, the laws included therein 
must have led to the effects observed in certain circumstances. If the question is “why 
did Z occur?”, the answer is: “because in conditions X, which did occur, laws P1,..., 
Pn say that Z has to occur as well”. The question of: “Why does the water in the observed 
glass boil?” can be answered as follows: “The water boils because the air pressure is 
normal, the water temperature is 100 °C, and the law says that whenever the air pres­
sure is normal and the water temperature is 100 °C, water boils”. Explanation therefore 
involves indicating the general regularities, which are laws included in a given theory. 
But not every regularity may be called a law. Let us assume that it has been established 
that none of hundreds of thousands of Warsaw University graduates has ever come 
down with the plague. But if the question of: “Why has Jan never come down with 
the plague?” is answered as follows: “Because he graduated from Warsaw University, 
and no Warsaw University graduate has ever come down with the plague”, it may not 
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be considered a convincing explanation. It seems unlikely that the indicated regularity 
affects these statistics. It seems that the absence of cases of the plague among Warsaw 
University graduates is rather a lucky coincidence, and thus not eligible to be called 
a law. A scientific explanation requires that the indicated regularities be laws of science. 
A scientific law, like a national law, prohibits certain states of affairs and excludes 
the possibility of their occurrence in the past and in the future. Meanwhile, notwith­
standing the fact that not a single Warsaw University graduate has come down with 
the plague, although they could have come down with it, graduating from Warsaw 
University has not improved their resistance to this disease. It seems particularly 
unlikely that the people who did go down with the plague would not have come down 
with the disease if they had graduated from Warsaw University. The scientific law 
regarding the boiling of water says that it is not possible that a sample of water does 
not boil in certain specific conditions. Every water sample would boil if these condi­
tions occurred. 
Unfortunately, scientific laws in the strict sense are encountered only in natural 
sciences. No such strict scientific laws are formulated in social sciences, which are 
content with discovering empirical generalisations of causal nature. In the case of 
social sciences, explanation involves usually an indication of the reason for a given 
phenomenon. The question of: “Why did phenomenon Z occur?” is answered as follows: 
“Phenomenon Z was triggered by causes p1, p2,...pn”. When formulating an explanation 
of such type, there is no indication of conditions that always lead to a certain effect 
according to some law. What are indicated, however, are the causes that have led to 
the occurrence of the phenomenon in certain pre-existent conditions. In the case of 
social sciences, we usually deal with phenomena triggered not by one specific cause, 
but rather by a larger number of causes, with each such cause having an impact on 
the occurrence of a given phenomenon. Theories cover only part of the significant 
causes. Arriving at a set of causes explaining 50% of variability of the explained 
phenomenon is considered a success. But it may turn out that these causes are inde­
pendent of one another. 
Theories that can explain any possible phenomenon are of no cognitive value. In the 
19th century, there was a common view that human behaviour could be explained by 
instincts that drive humans – and many such instincts were listed (Hergenhahn and 
Henley, 2017). If somebody looks for company, they must be clearly driven by the 
socialistic instinct. But opting for solitude may be explained by the individualistic 
instinct. A theory of this type is able to explain any kind of human behaviour, which 
makes it cognitively void. Similar reservations have been voiced about psychoanalysis: 
“Can you think of a dream that a psychoanalyst would consider impossible to be had?” 
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Mario Bunge (1996) wrote a radical essay where he included a quite long list of pseudo-
scientific areas of knowledge, devoid of the possibility of falsifying hypotheses, but 
still present at many universities. Among those areas was pseudo-mathematical sym­
bolism using social notions to resemble formulas involving physical quantities, e.g.: 
social frustration /mobility = participation in political life. 
Forecasting
Forecasting is common to all fields of science. Even palaeontologists seem to try to 
predict the excavations they may find. Familiarity with scientific laws and with the 
principles of cause and effect makes it possible not only to explain, but also to predict 
phenomena, which means the ability to answer questions like: “What will happen in 
conditions XX?” or “What conditions need to be created to cause Y”? While the ability 
of a theory to explain phenomena offers a sense of understanding reality, the ability 
to predict phenomena grants practical advantages that make it possible to achieve the 
desired goals and avoid undesirable events. Forecasting – unlike explaining – may 
also be based on regularities that are not of causal nature. Correlative relationships 
will suffice to this end. It is possible to predict the future achievements of students 
based on their entrance examination results, although there is no cause and effect 
relationship between the two. 
Forecasts offered by natural sciences are much more valuable than those provided by 
social sciences. The reason behind this lies in the very subject of research conducted 
in these two types of sciences. In the case of natural sciences, studies explore systems 
of a relatively low level of complexity, composed of a small number of components, 
featuring a small quantity of factors of impact. Newton’s theorem describing the Solar 
System considers only the force of gravity acting between celestial objects and utilises 
the law of universal gravitation to make it possible to formulate accurate predictions 
for the forthcoming thousands of years. It is difficult to imagine such a situation in 
the case of social sciences, where the researcher needs to take into account the exist­
ence of hundreds of simultaneously occurring variables, additionally involved in 
complex interaction with one another. With natural sciences, in turn, even if there 
are some complex systems, it is possible to concentrate – at least at the first approxi­
mation – on only a few of the most crucial elements, which always makes an issue 
easier to manage. Besides, complex systems are usually relatively easy to ‘decompose’ 
into simpler subsystems that can be examined in isolation from each other. The Solar 
System is composed of thousands of elements, but Newton was able to limit his studies 
to only a few of them – namely the Sun and the planets – with a fruitful outcome, as 
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it turned out. Moreover, the possibility of analysing the movement of each planet 
around the Sun separately and with a reasonable degree of accuracy, ignoring the 
interaction with other planets, became evident. It is unfeasible to reduce hundreds of 
thousands of businesses to the several most important ones and to analyse the rela­
tionships between them in separate pairs. There is also the instrumentalist approach, 
supported by Milton Friedman among others, who claimed that scientific theories 
cannot be tested by testing the realism of their assumptions, and all that matters is 
the accuracy of a theory’s predictions, not whether or not its assumptions are true 
(Rzeszutek and Szyszka, 2017).
According to a well-known myth, when Oedipus’ father heard a prophecy that he 
would be killed by his new-born son, he abandoned the child, triggering a series of 
events that concluded with his death at the hands of Oedipus. Self-fulfilling prophecies 
such as the “Oedipus effect” are a phenomenon absent from natural sciences. The term 
was coined by Robert Merton (1948), who first used it in an article entitled “The Self 
Fulfilling Prophecy”. The very fact of announcing a prediction may lead to its fulfil­
ment, or by contrast, to its non-fulfilment because of the fact that society will make 
its decisions whilst taking the prediction into consideration. Spreading false news of 
a situation where a bank is reputedly insolvent may cause the bank’s clients to with­
draw their money from the bank, which may lead to the actual bankruptcy of this 
bank. Generally speaking, the outcome of scientific research on society has an impact 
on the society itself. It should be quite obvious that the influence of this phenomenon 
on the accuracy of predictions in social sciences is destructive. Karl Popper (1957) 
claimed that it is impossible to predict the future of societies using scientific methods. 
The course of history is unpredictable because of purely logical reasons. Even if some­
one developed a calendar of social life, it would lead to events or actions that might 
thwart the predictions included therein. Let’s assume that one day, the calendar 
announces a three-day increase in stock prices followed by a precipitous drop in these 
prices. Stockholders would try to sell their stocks on the third day at the latest, causing 
an earlier slump, which would lead to the invalidation of said forecast.
Experiment
Natural sciences offer an opportunity to conduct repetitive and universal experiments 
that make it possible to trigger the same phenomenon in convenient conditions a num­
ber of times, and to manipulate only one factor while controlling other ones, which 
allows one to draw reliable conclusions. In the case of social sciences, the possibility 
of conducting experiments is limited. Research is usually based on observation that 
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makes it impossible to isolate single factors in controlled conditions. No experiment 
can be repeated in identical conditions; and no research result obtained in an experi-
ment may therefore depend on factors beyond the experimenter’s control. When other 
researchers fail to replicate an experiment, it is unknown whether the reason is the 
lack of a real relationship between variables, or the occurrence of a factor missing 
from the original experiment.
Although the behavioural approach to social sciences involves the application of 
experiments as a research method, there are additional interpretational difficulties 
absent from natural sciences, such as the external validity of research. Here is an 
example of a behavioural economics experiment called the ultimatum game (Carter, 
1991). There are two people taking part in the experiment: A and B. The moderator 
gives $100 to person A. Next, person A is asked to offer any part of the received amount 
to person B. If person B accepts the amount obtained from A, both people will be able 
to keep their respective amounts. But if person B rejects A’s offer, both people lose all 
the money to be received. Assuming that each of the entities involved maximises utility, 
cooperation between person A and person B would proceed as follows: Person A offers 
any amount from a left-open interval ($0;$100>. Person B accepts any of these amounts. 
If, for instance, person A offers $10, it would be reasonable for person B to accept the 
offer because the utility of $10 is greater than the utility of zero dollars. In reality, not 
many people in A’s place offered B an amount as low as $10. And even if such an offer 
eventuated, it was usually rejected by B as too low. To the majority of research subjects, 
there was another factor that appeared to be more important than profit maximisation. 
This factor was a sense of justice. Person A did not offer extremely low amounts to 
person B because of the awareness that person B would not regard such amounts as 
fair or just. If person B rejects the offer, both people lose everything. It turned out that 
person A offered amounts close to $50. 
Even though the ultimatum game experiment has made it possible to determine human 
behaviour in artificial conditions, an important question a researcher needs to ask 
themselves is about the external validity of the experiment, i.e. to what extent the 
discovered regularities can be generalised with regard to real human behaviour in 
natural conditions. The case is similar to hypothetical choices made by participants 
in experiments. Can the results of such experiments be generalised with regard to 
decisions actually made in business and in everyday life?
In natural sciences, the course of a phenomenon is usually determined by only a few 
variables, taken into account by theory as well. In the case of social sciences, theories 
consider only part of the variables of significance to a given phenomenon. It is impos­
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sible to take all variables into consideration because of the number of them and the 
fact that many significant variables are simply unknown. The regularities identified 
by social sciences are most often only probabilistic for this very reason. The behaviour 
of phenomena described by a given theory depends not only on the factors taken into 
account by this theory, but on other factors outside of its range as well. 
Furthermore, in light of people’s sensitivity to information which they receive and 
which may influence their opinions and, as a consequence, their decisions, creating 
a theory that would make accurate forecasts possible seems rather unlikely. An exam­
ple of human sensitivity to received information is the case of the increase in the price 
of stocks of Dayang Trands, a Chinese clothing company. The price of their shares 
rose by 100% within less than a fortnight after a famous American investor, Warren 
Buffett, said in public that he wore suits made by the company. Oskar Morgenstern, 
the co-creator of the expected utility theorem, did not believe that economics could 
be used in forecasting economic events. Consumers, managers, and politicians take 
such forecasts into consideration and change their actions and decisions on that basis. 
This forces forecasters to modify their predictions, which, in turn, forces the audience 
of these predictions to react. According to Morgenstern, statistical methods in economics 
are virtually useless unless used for descriptive purposes (Bernstein, 1997).
Discussion
Using experimentation as the basic research method in behavioural economics offers 
a number of advantages. It helps overcome many methodological deficiencies which 
curb the development of social sciences, such as the limited ability to detect causal 
relationships and the difficulties related to theory testing. The application of empiri­
cal research favours the formulation of testable hypotheses. The development of the 
descriptive side of economics is ongoing, providing more information on how people 
actually make their decisions and form opinions, and about the reasons behind them. 
The situation is similar in the case of other behavioural approaches to social sciences 
such as behavioural law, behavioural ethics, behavioural finance, or behavioural 
management. Furthermore, the recent past has seen noticeable development in terms 
of application domains (nudge, behavioural design), describing the application of dis­
coveries from the behavioural social sciences in social and corporate policies. The 
popularity of the behavioural approach is increasing year­by­year. Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky’s article (1979) entitled “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision 
under risk”, being one of the first significant works from the behavioural economics, 
has been quoted over 47,000 times so far, which is one of the largest such results in 
Vol. 25, No. 4/2017 DOI: 10.7206/jmba.ce.2450-7814.213
JMBA.CE 191Behavioural Economics in the Context of Social Science Methodology 
social sciences. It seems that the dynamic development of behavioural economics, 
crowned with the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences awarded to Richard 
Thaler in 2017, will contribute to an increasingly better level of cognition, understand­
ing, and even forecasting of human economic behaviour.
However, the behavioural approach to economics does not solve all methodological 
problems in the social sciences. In fact, it actually generates new problems. For 
instance, limiting oneself to a description of only selected human behaviour makes 
behavioural models open to the charge of fragmentarism. Many economists do not 
treat the behavioural approach as a consistent, homogeneous scientific area, but rather 
as a set of loosely connected themes concentrated mainly on modifying the classical 
economic theories by confronting them with the findings of empirical research 
(Rzeszutek and Szyszka, 2017). 
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